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Abstract
We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy
rules. We ﬁnd that tax rules separated from project cum subsidy decisions ex-
hibit several advantages when incentive problems of the agenda-setter are taken
into account. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal of ineﬃcient
projects which beneﬁt only a small lobby group. We propose “redistribution
eﬃciency” as a socially desirable property of proposals and ﬁnd that tax rules
always guarantee redistribution eﬃciency. We show that rules on subsidies com-
bined with discretion regarding taxes always yield socially inferior proposals.
Finally, tax rules induce the agenda-setter to look for potential improvements of
public projects.
Keywords: constitutional design, provision of public projects, voting, taxes and
subsidies
JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, H40
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and suggestions.1 Introduction
Democratic societies are characterized by separation between the ﬁnancing of govern-
ment expenditures and public project cum subsidy decisions. The ﬁnancing of govern-
ment expenditures is determined by detailed tax laws. Separately, legislatures decide
on public projects and associated subsidy payments to members of the polity. Usually
there are no legal constraints on the chosen subsidy scheme for a speciﬁc project.
This separation can be illustrated by various examples. Consider ﬁrst public housing
programs. The government builds houses and subsidizes rents so that a particular
group in society particularly beneﬁts from the program. The program is ﬁnanced
through tax revenues raised according to a separate tax law and independently of the
speciﬁc project. Second, the government may invest in public transportation and si-
multaneously subsidize tickets for speciﬁc subgroups, such as the elderly. The subsidies
are taken from government revenues generated by direct and indirect taxation. Third,
a government may decide to foster growth in a particular region by investing in public
infrastructure while simultaneously subsidizing entrepreneurs willing to move to this
region. Again, ﬁnancing occurs through tax revenues, independently of who beneﬁts
from the speciﬁc project.
In this paper we provide a political-economy rationale for the separation between the
ﬁnancing of government expenditures and public project cum subsidy decisions. We
also explore the limitations of this widespread procedure.
In standard models of mechanism design, tying the benevolent mechanism designer’s
hands by imposing restrictions on possible tax schemes can never be welfare improving.1
By contrast, our paper assumes an agenda-setter who pursues his own interests. This
opens up a potential role for restrictions on taxes to improve welfare.
We consider a society with a continuum of citizens where an agenda-setter can make
a proposal about the adoption of a public project and the distribution of taxes and
subsidies. The proposal is adopted if it is supported by a majority of voters. Our
model involves three incentive problems. First, the agenda-setter may want to provide
a public project if it is beneﬁcial to her, although the project may be undesirable
1For a survey of the literature on mechanism design see Jackson (2001).
2from a utilitarian perspective. Second, the agenda-setter may want to raise more taxes
than necessary in order to pay out subsidies to herself or to other citizens. Third, the
agenda-setter may not want to look for the most eﬃcient variant of the public project.
We investigate the types of rules that are suitable for limiting the distortions arising
from these incentive problems. We obtain ﬁve major ﬁndings.
First, we ﬁnd that tax rules may prevent the agenda-setter from securing the necessary
majority of voters for socially ineﬃcient projects that beneﬁt only a small lobby group.
By contrast, the absence of tax rules enables the proposer to enforce any project
irrespective of its characteristics.
Second, tax rules reduce wasteful subsidies to a minimum, i.e. only redistribution-
eﬃcient proposals are made. The intuition for this ﬁnding is that under tax rules a
large amount of total subsidies also implies high taxes for the agenda-setter.
Third, a constitution with rules on both taxes and subsidies is robust to counter-
proposals, whereas the other constitutions under consideration are prone to cycles of
project adoption and project reversal.
Fourth, we ﬁnd that in combination with arbitrary taxation subsidy rules yield high
welfare losses. Such a constitution is inferior to one with no rules on taxes and subsidies.
Fifth, an additional rationale for tax rules materializes when project characteristics are
endogenous. We show that only constitutions involving tax rules induce the agenda-
setter to enhance project eﬃciency.
Overall, our paper provides a rationale suggesting that if incentive problems for the
agenda-setter are taken into account decisions on projects cum subsidies should be
separated from decisions on tax rules. Tax rules encoded in tax laws separated from
public project cum subsidy decisions have several advantages over a scheme in which
ﬁnancing, project decision, and subsidies are jointly put to a vote.
The paper is organized as follows: We review the related literature in Section 2. Section
3 develops the basic framework. Sections 4-7 examine the outcomes for constitutions
that diﬀer with respect to their rules on taxes and subsidies. In Section 8 we examine
the welfare implications of diﬀerent constitutions. Section 9 discusses socially optimal
constitutional rules for diﬀerent categories of projects. We analyze endogenous project
design in Section 10, and Section 11 concludes.
32 Relation to the Literature
There are no other studies inquiring why a polity may adopt strict tax rules but allow
ﬂexibility in using subsidies in public-project provision. Our paper is a contribution to
constructive constitutional economics, as outlined in the seminal study by Buchanan
and Tullock (1962). Using the veil-of-ignorance device (see Rawls (1971)), Buchanan
and Tullock (1962) have examined the costs and beneﬁts of majority rules.2 Aghion
and Bolton (2003) have reﬁned and expanded this approach. When a society faces
deadweight costs of redistribution, simple or supermajority rules are preferred to una-
nimity in order to overcome vested interests.3 Gersbach (2004) and Gersbach (2009)
show that increasingly sophisticated agenda and decision rules further improve the ef-
ﬁciency of public-project provision when all admissible rules have to fulﬁll the liberal
democracy constraint.
In this paper we focus on the eﬃciency properties of the simple or supermajority rule
when it is coupled with tax or subsidy rules. Our main insight is that tax rules exhibit a
variety of advantages and can rationalize the separation of taxation from public-project
provision and subsidies.4
There is an extensive body of literature on optimal mechanisms for providing public
goods when income taxes are a source of public-goods ﬁnance.5 Hellwig (2004) shows
that when both income taxation and public-sector pricing are plagued by incentive
considerations it is desirable to use a combination of income taxation and admission
fees to ﬁnance public goods. We disregard incentive considerations at the citizen level
and assume that ﬁnancing is achieved by a simple, possibly personalized, lump-sum
tax scheme. Our focus is on the incentive problem of the agenda-setter.6
2Closely related ideas have been developed by Rae (1969) and Taylor (1969).
3In a complete contract framework, Romer and Rosenthal (1983) have established that a unanimity
rule may implement the full-information eﬃcient solution when payoﬀs are private information but
no deadweight costs of transfers arise.
4In our model, subsidies can be used to ensure the majority necessary for the adoption of a proposal
and thus represent the institutionalized way of forming majorities in advanced democracies. There
is an extensive body of literature on vote buying (see Groseclose and Snyder (1996) and Dekel et al.
(2008), among others), where agenda-setters buy votes by using a stock of wealth.
5From G¨ uth and Hellwig (1986), Rob (1989), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), and Hellwig (2003)
we know that in large economies it is impossible to obtain eﬃcient outcomes in public-good provision
if participation constraints have to be respected.
6Bierbrauer (2009) shows that coercion is desirable for the ﬁnancing of public goods if those goods
are provided by a malevolent leviathan. We take it as given that the government can impose taxes.
43 Model
3.1 Set-up
We consider a society facing the standard problem of public-project provision and
ﬁnancing. Citizens are indexed by j and are uniformly arranged on the unit interval.
The provision of a public project yields utility vj ∀j ∈ [0,1] and involves per-capita costs
k ≥ 0. For simplicity of exposition, we assume vj ∈ {Vw,Vl} with Vw ≥ 0 and Vw > Vl.
Accordingly, we refer to individuals obtaining Vw from the public project provision as
“project winners” and to individuals receiving beneﬁts Vl as “project losers.” Without
loss of generality, we assume the project winners to be located on the interval [0,p] and
the project losers to be located on the interval ]p,1].
One particular individual can make a proposal π, which comprises a tax and a subsidy
distribution as well as the project decision. There are diﬀerent ways of modeling which
citizen has the right to set the agenda. We adopt the view that in a democracy it is
impossible to deter beneﬁciaries of public projects from making proposals.7 Hence we
directly assume that the agenda-setter is a project winner. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the agenda-setter is j = 0.
Subsidies and taxes are constrained to be non-negative. Moreover, there is some maxi-
mal level of subsidies denoted by ˆ s with ˆ s ≥ Vw−Vl.8 Let S be the set of all non-negative
Lebesgue-measurable functions on the unit interval that do not exceed ˆ s. Thus each
subsidy scheme involved by a proposal π is a function s(π) ∈ S. Accordingly, let T be
the set of all non-negative Lebesgue-measurable functions on the unit interval. Then
each tax scheme can be written as a function t(π) ∈ T. Moreover, we use g(π) ∈ {0,1}
as a variable indicating whether the project will be adopted (g(π) = 1) or not (g(π) = 0)
according to proposal π.9
We consider distortionary taxes, i.e. for each unit of taxes that is paid by a particular
individual, only a fraction 1/(1 + λ) (λ > 0) can be used to ﬁnance the project or
7Another approach commonly applied is random selection of agenda-setters (see Gersbach (2009)).
8The assumption ˆ s ≥ Vw−Vl simpliﬁes the exposition, but does not qualitatively aﬀect our ﬁndings.
9Lizzeri and Persico (2001) consider a model where the agenda-setter must choose between redis-
tribution and public-project provision. In our model, it is possible to combine public projects with
redistribution.
5subsidies. There are various interpretations of λ. It may represent resources used for
collecting and transferring funds from citizens to the state. The deadweight costs λ
may also represent the disincentive to work if wages are taxed. The assumption of
linear deadweight costs can be justiﬁed by the relationship between taxes paid for the
public project and individual income, the former being suﬃciently smaller than the
latter. Now the society’s budget constraint is
(1 + λ)[g(π)k + S(π)] = T(π), (1)
where we have introduced total subsidies S(π) :=
  1
0 sj(π)dj and total tax revenues
T(π) :=
  1
0 tj(π)dj implied by proposal π. We assume Vw −(1+λ)k > 0 and Vl −(1+
λ)k < 0.
Now we are in a position to give a formal description of the general set of possible
proposals.
Π := {π ∈ {0,1} × S × T | (1 + λ)[g(π)k + S(π)] = T(π)}. (2)
3.2 Constitutions
We adopt the standard “veil of ignorance” procedure for constitutional design. The
social choice problem is reduced to a two-period setting. The ﬁrst period is the con-
stitutional period and the second the legislative period. In the constitutional period
all citizens are assumed to be identical and do not know whether they will be project
winners or project losers. Moreover, the project’s parameters Vw, Vl, k, and p are not
known with certainty. Citizens design a constitution or an incomplete social contract
governing the supply of public goods, given a commonly known distribution of the
project parameters.10
Under the incomplete contract perspective, rules cannot depend on project character-
istics, as those characteristics are not veriﬁable in court. Consequently, the rules that
can be adopted in the constitutional period are those constraining the tax and subsidy
schemes the agenda-setter is allowed to use. In this paper we adopt the perspective
that in the constitutional period the decision rule that will be used later is given. In
10Incomplete social contracts have been studied by Aghion and Bolton (2003) and Gersbach (2009),
among others.
6particular, we assume that a proposal will be adopted if it receives at least a fraction
m of all votes. The only assumption we make is that 1






we show later this assumption will signiﬁcantly simplify our analysis.
In our model a constitution is simply a set of rules that constrain the set of propos-
als the agenda-setter can make. Accordingly, Π represents a particular constitution,
namely one without any further rules. In the course of the article we will consider less
discretionary constitutions and impose rules on tax and/or on subsidy distribution.
These constitutions represent subsets of Π.
It will be useful to deﬁne the set of all possible projects. It comprises all quadruples
(Vw,Vl,k,p) that satisfy the assumptions we have introduced so far. Formally, it is
given by
P :={(Vw,Vl,k,p) ∈ R
+ × R × R
+×]0;1[:
p > m − 1/(1 + λ),Vw > (1 + λ)k,Vl < (1 + λ)k, ˆ s ≥ Vw + Vl},
(3)
where R and R+ denote the sets of real numbers and non-negative real numbers re-
spectively. The prior distribution of the project parameters can now be described by
a joint probability density function on P. At this stage, we do not specify a particular
form for this density function.
3.3 The legislative period
In the legislative period, each individual observes vj and k, and all individual valuations
become common knowledge.12 The agenda-setter makes a proposal that must obey the
constitutional rules, otherwise the proposal is declared to be unconstitutional and the
status quo prevails.
If proposal π is adopted, the utility of individual j ∈ [0;1] will be13
uj(π) = g(π)vj + sj(π) − tj(π). (4)
11Plausible estimates of λ lie between 0.2 and 0.5 (see Stuart (1984), Ballard et al. (1985), and
Browning (1987)). For these estimates and the simple majority rule (m = 1/2) the assumption
1/2 ≤ m < min{1/(1 + λ) + p,1} is always fulﬁlled.
12An interesting variant of our model would involve citizens having private information about their
types vj ∈ {Vw,Vl}, while the value of p is commonly known. This variant leads to results similar to
those in this paper. A formal analysis of this case is available upon request.
13We assume that the income of individuals is suﬃcient to pay taxes under any proposal considered
in the paper.
7We assume that each individual will vote in favor of the proposal if and only if uj(π) ≥
0. It will be useful to deﬁne the indicator function I(π), which adopts a value of 1 if
the proposal is implemented and of zero otherwise.
I(π) :=
 
1 if uj(π) ≥ 0 for at least a fraction m of voters
0 otherwise.
(5)
Thus we can write the expected utility of individual j as Uj(π) = I(π)uj(π) given
proposal π has been made. In addition, the utilitarian welfare measure for a particular
proposal π amounts to
W(π) := I(π)[(pVw + (1 − p)Vl − k(1 + λ))g(π) − λS(π)]. (6)
For the sake of simplicity, we introduce the following tie-breaking rule: If the agenda-
setter is indiﬀerent between several proposals, she will choose a proposal with the
highest u0(π), i.e. a proposal that if implemented would yield the highest utility for
her.
3.4 Socially eﬃcient solutions
As a starting point it is instructive to consider socially optimal proposals. Consider a
social planner who maximizes the utilitarian welfare measure by choosing and imple-
menting a proposal π ∈ Π for a given realization of the project parameters Vw, Vl, k,
and p. It is obvious that the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1
A socially optimal proposal π has the following characteristics:
g(π) =
 
1 for pVw + (1 − p)Vl ≥ (1 + λ)k
0 for pVw + (1 − p)Vl < (1 + λ)k
(7)
S(π) = 0. (8)
In particular, the social planner will never choose a positive level of total subsidies
because of the losses caused by distortionary taxation. We note that the socially
optimal solution is not normally unique because for g(π) = 1 the social planner is
indiﬀerent with respect to all possible tax schemes raising the revenues necessary to
ﬁnance the project.
8If the project parameters p, Vw, Vl, and k were veriﬁable, it would be straightforward
to characterize a constitution guaranteeing the optimal level of welfare. However, we
assume in the following that constitutional rules cannot depend on project character-
istics, as even for perfectly observable costs and beneﬁts of projects it is plausible that
the project characteristics are not veriﬁable in court.
3.5 Evaluation criteria
In the following we establish several desirable properties of constitutions. For this
purpose it will be useful to deﬁne the following concept:
Deﬁnition 1
For a given constitution   Π ⊆ Π, a proposal π ∈   Π with I(π) = 1 is redistribution-
eﬃcient if no π′ ∈   Π exists with S(π′) < S(π), g(π) = g(π′) and I(π′) = 1. A proposal
with I(π) = 0 is always redistribution-eﬃcient.
For example, we refer to a proposal π that ensures the adoption of the project as
redistribution-eﬃcient if no alternative proposal exists that would guarantee the adop-
tion of the project while involving strictly lower total subsidies. It is obvious that
redistribution-eﬃciency is a desirable property of proposals, as it keeps wasteful redis-
tribution to a minimum.
Deﬁnition 2
We refer to a constitution under which only redistribution-eﬃcient proposals are made
as a constitution satisfying GREP (guarantees redistribution-eﬃcient proposals).
Now we turn to further desirable property of constitutions. While it is plausible that
designing socially desirable projects is diﬃcult, it may be much easier to conceive of
socially harmful projects that beneﬁt only a small lobby group. Thus one important
feature of a constitution may be that it prevents the adoption of projects of this kind.
To be more precise, we deﬁne the set of lobby projects LP(ε) ⊂ P for ε < 1/2 as the
set of all projects in P with parameters Vw, Vl, k, and p such that |Vw − k(1 + λ)| <
|Vl − k(1 + λ)| and p ≤ ε. Note that condition |Vw − k(1 + λ)| < |Vl − k(1 + λ)| can
be interpreted as the net beneﬁts of project winners being lower than the net losses of
project losers. For p < 1/2 this obviously implies pVw + (1 − p)Vl < (1 + λ)k.
9Deﬁnition 3
A constitution satisﬁes the property of “protection against lobby projects” (henceforth
PALP) if a value for ε ∈]0;1/2[ exists such that all projects in the set LP(ε) are never
adopted in equilibrium.
As a consequence, citizens would agree on a constitution satisfying PALP under a veil
of ignorance if suﬃcient signiﬁcance were attached to bad lobby projects in the prior
distribution of project characteristics.
The reversal of some projects, like the construction of public buildings or infrastructure,
may be prohibitively costly compared to the beneﬁts involved. But in other cases
project reversal may be relatively easy. Examples are a reform of penal law or changes
to the tax system. For these cases, we cannot rule out the eventuality of one of the
project losers proposing to reverse the project after a proposal has been adopted. It
is obvious that a sequence of project adoption, reversal, renewed project adoption,
and so forth is not desirable. Thus we propose robustness against counter-proposals
(henceforth RACP) as another criterion for evaluating constitutions. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that potentially reversible projects involve negligible costs k, i.e. k = 0. So
if the original project involves p = p0, Vl = V 0
l , and Vw = V 0
w, reversal of the project
can be characterized by p = 1 − p0, Vl = −V 0
w, and Vw = −V 0
l .
In order to consider the reversal of projects, we have to specify a game involving a
sequence of legislative stages. For simplicity of exposition we assume that agenda-
setters and voters are short-sighted when making a proposal or voting. For example,
when a decision is to be taken, voters do not take into account the eventuality of the
project being reversed in the future. This assumption does not qualitatively aﬀect our
results. To sum up, a potentially reversible project can be reversed if both itself and
the reversal of the project can be adopted in an equilibrium of our basic model.
We are now in a position to deﬁne RACP as follows:
Deﬁnition 4
A constitution displays robustness against counter-proposals (RACP) if no potentially
reversible project can be reversed by a respective counter-proposal.
10Obviously, it may be possible to rule out project reversal directly in the constitution.
However, in a richer framework with project costs and beneﬁts that are uncertain before
implementation, such a constitutional rule may be disadvantageous as it eliminates the
possibility to reverse projects that have turned out to be much less desirable than
expected. Then constitutions displaying RACP may be desirable.
4 Arbitrary Tax Code and Arbitrary Subsidy Scheme
In our ﬁrst scenario we impose no additional rules on taxes and subsidies, i.e. the
agenda-setter can choose any proposal π ∈ Π.
Proposition 1
For constitution Π the agenda-setter will always choose a proposal π∗ with g(π∗) = 1,
t0(π∗) = 0, s0(π∗) =   s, and I(π∗) = 1.
Proof
The agenda-setter solves the following problem:
max
π∈Π
{(g(π)Vw + s0(π) − t0(π))I(π)}.
It is obvious that g(π) = 1, t0(π) = 0, and s0(π) =   s guarantee maximum utility for the
agenda-setter, provided that the proposal is actually adopted. Importantly, a proposal
with g(π) = 1, t0(π) = 0, and s0(π) =   s that entails I(π) = 1 always exists. For
example, the agenda-setter can impose zero taxes on all individuals from the interval
]0;m] and tax all individuals from the interval ]m,1] identically to cover the costs for
the project k and the subsidies S(π) that may be necessary to gain support from all
members in ]0;m].
2
Interestingly, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2
For constitution Π a proposal chosen by the agenda-setter may be redistribution-
ineﬃcient. Therefore constitution Π does not satisfy GREP.
Proof
The proof of this lemma is straightforward. Suppose a redistribution-eﬃcient proposal
11π∗ exists that maximizes the agenda-setter’s utility. It is obvious that for π∗ some
project losers exist who receive no subsidies (sj(π∗) = 0). Now we can modify π∗ by
introducing positive subsidies for these individuals, which are ﬁnanced by additional
taxes for these very persons. The resulting proposal would also be adopted, but is
clearly not redistribution-eﬃcient. Thus for each redistribution-eﬃcient proposal we
can ﬁnd a multitude of proposals that are not redistribution-eﬃcient.
2
In addition, as all projects are adopted, it is obvious that the following lemma holds:
Lemma 3
Constitution Π does not satisfy PALP.
Intuitively, the high degree of ﬂexibility for the proposer enables her to adopt any




Constitution Π does not satisfy RACP.
As any project can be adopted by a suitable tax-subsidy scheme, it is obvious that any
project can be reversed by a respective counter-proposal.
5 Uniform Tax Code and Arbitrary Subsidy Scheme
Now we impose the requirement that all individuals have to be treated identically with
respect to taxation. Recall that individuals have the same income, so equal taxation
is the only tax rule that is non-discriminatory. As a consequence, we consider the
following constitution:
ΠT := {πT ∈ Π | tj(πT) = ti(πT) ∀i,j ∈ [0,1]}. (9)




w := (1 + λ)
k − (m − p)Vl
1 − (1 + λ)(m − p)
. (10)
12Note that, for p < m, V ∗
w > 0 follows from the assumption m < min{ 1
1+λ + p,1}. It is
straightforward to verify V ∗
w − Vl > 0, which follows from Vl − (1 + λ)k < 0.
Proposition 2
For constitution ΠT a unique14 equilibrium proposal π∗
T exists.
1. For Vw ≥ V ∗
w and p < m, π∗
T is given by g(π∗
T) = 1, tj(π∗
T) = V ∗





   
   
ˆ s for j = 0
0 for j ∈]0,p]
V ∗
w − Vl for j ∈]p,m]
0 for j ∈]m,1].
(11)
2. For Vw < V ∗
w and p < m, π∗
T is given by g(π∗
T) = 0, tj(π∗





ˆ s for j = 0
0 for j ∈]0,1].
(12)
3. For p ≥ m, π∗
T is given by g(π∗
T) = 1, tj(π∗





ˆ s for j = 0
0 for j ∈]0,1].
(13)
The equilibrium proposal is always adopted.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix A. According to Proposition 2, the
agenda-setter will always choose the maximum level of subsidies for herself, which is
plausible. In the following, we discuss the three cases mentioned in the proposition
separately.
For p ≥ m, the project winners alone can enforce the adoption of the project. As a
consequence, a proposal will secure the necessary majority, even if it involves zero total
subsidies, i.e. subsidies only to a group of Lebesgue measure zero.
For p < m, it is necessary to subsidize some project losers to induce them to accept the
project. In the proof we show that V ∗
w represents the level of taxes that is necessary to
ﬁnance these subsidies. For Vw ≥ V ∗
w, the project winners’ gains Vw from the project
exceed this tax level. However, for Vw < V ∗
w the beneﬁts of the project winners are so
14More precisely, the proposal is unique up to relabeling individuals and redistribution within masses
of Lebesgue measure zero. We will use “unique” in this sense throughout the paper.
13low that they are not willing to ﬁnance the subsidies necessary to induce some project
losers to support the proposal. Thus the agenda-setter will choose a proposal πT with
g(πT) = 0.
It is important to note that the agenda-setter always chooses a redistribution-eﬃcient
proposal. A proposal with a higher level of total subsidies S(π) would entail a higher
level of taxes, which would be harmful to the agenda-setter. We summarize this obser-
vation in the following lemma:
Lemma 5
Constitution ΠT satisﬁes GREP, i.e. proposal π∗
T is always redistribution-eﬃcient.
In Appendix B we also show
Lemma 6
Constitution ΠT satisﬁes PALP.
We note that projects with k = 0, p < m, and Vw ≥ V ∗
w are susceptible to counter-
proposals. As a consequence, we obtain
Lemma 7
Constitution ΠT violates RACP.
6 Arbitrary Tax Code and Uniform Subsidy Scheme
Now we consider a constitution that allows for arbitrary tax schemes. However, we
limit the subsidy schemes to those that treat all citizens identically. Hence we restrict
our attention to the set of proposals ΠS ⊂ Π with
ΠS := {πS ∈ Π | sj(πS) = si(πS) ∀i,j ∈ [0,1]}. (14)
For this case we obtain
Proposition 3
For constitution ΠS each equilibrium proposal π∗
S can be characterized by g(π∗
S) = 1,
sj(π∗
S) = ˆ s ∀j ∈ [0,1], t0(π∗
S) = 0, and I(π∗
S) = 1.
14Proof
The agenda-setter solves the following problem:
max
π∈Π
{g(π)Vw + s(π) − t0(π))I(π)}.
It is obvious that t0(π) = 0, s(π) = ˆ s, g(π) = 1 guarantee the highest possible payoﬀ
for the agenda-setter, provided that she can induce enough voters to support such a
proposal. It is always possible to secure the necessary majority by taxing only the
individuals from the interval ]m;1]. In this case, non-taxed project winners will vote
in favor of π (as Vw + ˆ s > 0) as well as non-taxed project losers (as Vl + ˆ s > 0), which
implies I(π) = 1.
2
As each proposal under ΠS involves the maximum amount of total subsidies S(π) =   s
and a proposal would also be accepted for slightly lower total subsidies, we obtain
Lemma 8
Under constitution ΠS the equilibrium proposal is never redistribution-eﬃcient. As a
consequence, ΠS violates GREP.
As constitution ΠS enables the proposer to implement all projects, even very poor ones,
it is obvious that
Lemma 9
Constitution ΠS does not satisfy PALP.
Additionally, it is straightforward to see
Lemma 10
Constitution ΠS does not satisfy RACP.
7 Uniform Tax Code and Uniform Subsidy Scheme
Finally we consider a constitution that stipulates that all citizens be treated equally
with respect to subsidies and taxes. Hence the set of feasible proposals reduces to
ΠST ⊂ Π, where
ΠST := ΠT ∩ ΠS. (15)
For this constitution we obtain
15Proposition 4
For constitution ΠST the equilibrium proposal π∗
ST is unique with sj(π∗
ST) = 0, tj(π∗
ST) =
(1 + λ)k ∀j ∈ [0,1], and g(π∗
ST) = 1. For this proposal I(π∗
ST) = 1 iﬀ p ≤ m.
Proof
The agenda-setter solves the following problem:
max
π∈Π
{(g(π)(Vw − (1 + λ)k) + s(π) − (1 + λ)s(π))I(π)}.
Under constitution ΠST, introducing subsidies is not worthwhile for the agenda-setter
as the taxes necessary to ﬁnance them are always higher. Thus a positive level of
subsidies makes the proposal less attractive to all citizens, including the agenda-setter
herself. As the agenda-setter always prefers project adoption, she will always propose
implementing the project.
2
We note that, for p ≥ m, the project winners are suﬃciently numerous to enforce the
project. For p < m the project losers can block the project.
Because the proposal never involves subsidies, we can conclude
Lemma 11
Proposal π∗
ST is always redistribution-eﬃcient. Thus ΠST satisﬁes GREP.
Our ﬁnding that projects with p < m are never adopted immediately implies
Lemma 12
Constitution ΠST satisﬁes PALP.
Interestingly, under constitution ΠST a project will be adopted if and only if p > m,
which immediately implies
Lemma 13
Constitution ΠST satisﬁes RACP.
8 Welfare Comparison
In this section we compare social welfare. In Appendix C we derive the expressions for
welfare for each constitution under a speciﬁc realization of project parameters Vw, Vl,
k, and p.
16For constitution Π welfare cannot be pinned down exactly, because a multitude of
redistribution-ineﬃcient proposals exist in addition to the redistribution-eﬃcient pro-
posals. However, it is possible to compute an upper boundary for welfare by computing
welfare for redistribution-eﬃcient proposals. In addition, the proposal with the highest
possible level of total subsidies   s yields a lower boundary for welfare under Π.
W(π
∗) ≤ pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k −
 
λ(m − p)max{0,−Vl} if p < m
0 if p ≥ m
(16)
W(π
∗) ≥ pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k − λˆ s (17)
Under constitution ΠT the project is adopted if p ≥ m or if p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w. Sub-









pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k − λ(m − p)(V ∗
w − Vl) if p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w
0 if p < m and Vw < V ∗
w
pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k if p ≥ m.
(18)
Under constitution ΠS the project will always be adopted. Moreover, the agenda-setter
will choose the maximum level of subsidies for herself and, because of the uniform
subsidy rule, for all other citizens as well.
W(π
∗
S) = pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k − λˆ s (19)
Under constitution ΠST no subsidies occur. Thus the project will be adopted if and





0 if p < m
pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k if p ≥ m.
(20)
We note that constitutions Π and ΠS both yield project adoption for any admissible
combination of the exogenous variables. However, ΠS entails a higher level of total
subsidies in general. As a consequence, constitution ΠS is inferior to constitution Π
and thus never represents the socially optimal constitution. Intuitively, the desire of
the agenda-setter to receive high subsidies together with the rule that all other citizens
are also required to receive the same level of subsidies induces excessive redistribution
under ΠS. Consequently, ΠS would never be adopted under a veil of ignorance.
17For the other three constitutions Π, ΠT, and ΠST no general ranking with respect to
welfare can be established that would hold for all admissible values of the exogenous
variables. Which one of these would be selected would depend on the distribution of
project parameters Vw, Vl, k, and p in general.
We can rank constitutions Π, ΠT, and ΠST according to their degree of restrictiveness,
with Π the least restrictive and ΠST the most restrictive constitution. Note that the
less restrictive the constitution is, the larger the set of parameter values will be for
which the project is adopted. This is intuitive, as less restrictive constitutions grant
the agenda-setter higher ﬂexibility in designing a proposal that will secure the majority
of votes. In particular, the least restrictive constitution Π yields project adoption for
any combination of parameters. The most restrictive constitution ΠST entails project
adoption for p ≥ m only.
The most restrictive constitution ΠST has the advantage of eliminating any redistri-
bution activity. However, for some parameter constellations this may involve costs, as
projects are never adopted if p < m, although they may be socially desirable.
9 Examples
In the following we consider the implications of our model for diﬀerent categories
of projects. Two arguments support this approach. First, it may be known at the
constitutional stage that a speciﬁc class of projects presents the major challenge facing
the polity. Second, and perhaps more importantly, while it may not be possible to write
constitutional rules dependent on project characteristics, it is plausible for diﬀerent
constitutional rules to be designed for diﬀerent categories of projects. Project categories
are likely to be veriﬁable, while the exact project parameters Vl, Vw, p, and k are not.
Accordingly, in the following we examine the optimal constitutional rules for diﬀerent
project categories. First we focus on the case of economic reform projects, then we
examine locally beneﬁcial projects.
189.1 Economic reforms
We focus here on the special case of economic reforms, which represent a subset of
P. One important characteristic of economic reforms, such as labor-market reforms or
product-market reforms leading to more intense competition, is that they are unlikely
to involve substantial direct costs k. Thus we set k = 0. Moreover, it is plausible
to assume that economic reforms will diﬀer in the eﬀect they have on small interest
groups and the large majority of the population. More speciﬁcally, we distinguish
between socially beneﬁcial economic reforms and socially detrimental reforms.
Socially beneﬁcial reforms, such as the liberalization of the agricultural sector, are
harmful to a small interest group, i.e. those working in this sector. However, they
are beneﬁcial to the rest of society as they stand to gain from lower prices or lower
subsidies, which in turn imply tower taxes. For this class of reforms we assume that p
is larger than m and that the total beneﬁts are positive, i.e. pVw + (1 − p)Vl > 0.
Socially detrimental reforms, like measures leading to lower competition in a speciﬁc
sector, beneﬁt only a small interest group, for example the shareholders of the ﬁrms in
the speciﬁed sector. As a consequence, for these reforms p < m and pVw+(1−p)Vl < 0
hold.
Interestingly, for economic reforms constitution ΠST will always implement the ﬁrst-
best. All socially desirable projects are adopted, and socially harmful projects are
never implemented. Moreover, there are no losses from redistribution. We summarize
this ﬁnding in the following proposition:
Proposition 5
Constitution ΠST always leads to the ﬁrst-best outcome.
We note that constitutions Π and ΠS are deﬁnitely inferior to ΠST, as under the ﬁrst
two constitutions all reforms are adopted, including the socially detrimental ones. Con-
stitution ΠT may only lead to a welfare level identical to the one implied by constitution
ΠST if Vw < V ∗
w holds for all socially detrimental reforms. Unless this is the case, ΠT
is strictly inferior to ΠST from an aggregate welfare perspective.
Hence, as far as economic reforms are concerned, highly restrictive rules maximize
citizen utility from an ex-ante perspective under a veil of ignorance.
199.2 Locally beneﬁcial projects
Next we study the case of locally beneﬁcial projects, such as hospitals, bridges, kinder-
gartens, or theaters. These projects yield beneﬁts to some of the citizens who live in
the vicinity, but largely leave the utility for the majority of citizens unchanged. Ac-
cordingly, we assume p < 1− m and Vl = 0. For simplicity we assume in the following
that costs k are uniformly distributed on the interval [0;k] and that Vw and p are drawn
from a degenerate distribution. In Appendix D we show
Proposition 6
For locally beneﬁcial projects there exists a critical value of k, denoted by ˆ k, such that
1. if k < ˆ k, then citizens will prefer ΠT to ΠST from an ex-ante perspective;
2. if k > ˆ k, then citizens will prefer ΠST to ΠT from an ex-ante perspective;
3. if k = ˆ k, then citizens will be indiﬀerent with respect to ΠST and ΠT from an
ex-ante perspective.
To sum up, whether citizens would choose ΠST or ΠT under a veil of ignorance depends
on the distribution of the project’s costs. If expected project costs are low, which
corresponds to a low value of k, then citizens will prefer ΠT because this constitution
will enable some projects to be adopted. However, it also involves losses due to the taxes
that need to be levied in order to subsidize some of the project losers. Conversely, for
high expected costs (or high k) citizens would prefer ΠST, as this constitution eliminates
the implementation of locally beneﬁcial projects completely.
10 Endogenous Project Characteristics
So far, we have discussed which proposal will be chosen by the agenda-setter for given
characteristics of the project. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the project
parameters Vw, Vl, k, and p are not exogenously given, but can be inﬂuenced by the
agenda-setter to some extent. While it is plausible to assume that the proposer will
attempt to design a project with high levels of Vw, which is to her own beneﬁt, the
interesting question arises as to the circumstances under which she may also aﬀect
project parameters k, p and Vl in a desirable way. An improvement of the project
20along these lines does not make the project more valuable to the agenda-setter directly.
Instead, it increases its beneﬁts for other citizens.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that the agenda-setter can exert eﬀort before she makes
the proposal. This eﬀort creates costs c > 0 for her. These costs are assumed to be so
small that they have no bearing on welfare. We consider three diﬀerent scenarios:
1. Improvement of the project for project losers:
Vl =
 
Vl if the agenda-setter does not exert eﬀort
Vl > Vl if the agenda-setter exerts eﬀort.
(21)
2. Increase of the fraction of project winners:
p =
 
p if the agenda-setter does not exert eﬀort
p > p if the agenda-setter exerts eﬀort.
(22)
3. Reduction of the project’s costs:
k =
 
k if the agenda-setter does not exert eﬀort
k < k if the agenda-setter exerts eﬀort.
(23)
In Appendix E we show
Proposition 7
1. Under constitutions Π and ΠS the agenda-setter has no incentive to enhance the
project under all three scenarios.
2. Under constitution ΠST the agenda-setter may enhance the project by increasing
p and by decreasing project costs k. She will never improve Vl.
3. Under constitution ΠT the agenda-setter may enhance the project under all sce-
narios.
Under constitutions Π and ΠS the agenda-setter can always achieve project adoption
and does not pay any taxes under her equilibrium proposal. Consequently, her utility
does not depend on parameters Vl, p, and k. Thus there are no incentives to incur the
costs necessary for the improvement of the project under all scenarios. Similarly, the
agenda-setter would never facilitate an increase in Vl under constitution ΠST. Exerting
21eﬀort does not reduce taxes for her, nor does it increase the likelihood of the project
being adopted.
There are, however, several cases where the agenda-setter may proﬁt from exerting
eﬀort. This applies to constitutions involving tax rules, i.e. for ΠT and ΠST. Tax
rules may induce agenda-setters to exert eﬀort for two reasons. First, exerting eﬀort
may secure the adoption of a project that would otherwise be rejected. For example,
if p < m and p ≥ m, exerting eﬀort to increase p will be optimal for the agenda-setter
for suﬃciently small c under constitution ΠST. Second, the agenda-setter may want
to improve the project, as this lowers the subsidies necessary to gain support for the
proposal, which in turn lowers her tax burden.
11 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined four constitutions with diﬀerent restrictions on taxes
and subsidies. We have shown that a constitution that imposes only the restriction of
identical treatment with respect to subsidies is always inferior to a constitution that
imposes no restrictions on taxes and subsidies. Thus constitution ΠS would never be
chosen at the constitutional stage.
Moreover, we have identiﬁed four advantages of tax rules. First, they always lead to
redistribution-eﬃcient proposals. As the agenda-setter has to pay the same amount of
taxes as any other citizen, she avoids excessive subsidies. Second, tax rules may induce
the agenda-setter to exert eﬀort in order to improve the project. Exerting eﬀort may
reduce the subsidies required to enlist the support of suﬃciently many voters, which
also reduces taxes for the agenda-setter. Moreover, under tax rules the likelihood of
project adoption is higher for more favorable projects. Third, constitutions without
tax rules grant a high degree of ﬂexibility to the agenda-setter, which enables her to
gain support for any project, irrespective of its character. By contrast, constitutions
with tax rules prevent the adoption of extremely bad projects that beneﬁt only a
small minority p, involve high costs k, and bring low beneﬁts Vl for losers. Fourth, a
constitution with rules both on taxes and subsidies displays the desirable feature of
robustness against counter-proposals. To sum up, our paper provides a rationale for
the observation that decisions on project cum subsidies are usually made independently
of decisions on rules that determine how government expenditures are ﬁnanced.
22A Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1: Uniform taxes imply the following problem for the agenda-setter:
max
π∈Π
{(g(π)(Vw − (1 + λ)k) + s0(π) − (1 + λ)S(π))I(π)}.
Recall that u0(π) = g(π)(Vw − (1 + λ)k) + s0(π) − (1 + λ)S(π).
Step 2: We ﬁrst construct the optimal proposal for the agenda-setter when the project is
not proposed. We denote this proposal by ˜ π.
We claim that ˜ π is given by g(˜ π) = 0, tj(˜ π) = 0, ∀j ∈ [0,1] and
sj(˜ π) =
 
ˆ s for j = 0
0 for j ∈]0,1].
To prove our claim, we ﬁrst argue that, in equilibrium, proposal ˜ π will be adopted
(i.e. I(˜ π) = 1) as uj(˜ π) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [0,1].
Second, any other proposal would yield a smaller u0(π). Hence proposal ˜ π max-
imizes u0(π)I(π) under the restriction that g(π) = 0.
Step 3: We now consider proposals when the project is proposed. In contrast to Step 2,
there is no unique proposal for all distributions of parameters p,m,Vw,Vl and k.
We therefore have to distinguish several cases.
Step 4: Consider the case p ≥ m.
We claim that the optimal proposal for the agenda-setter is given by g(π) = 1,
tj(π) = (1 + λ)k, ∀j ∈ [0,1] and sj(π) = sj(˜ π).
To prove the claim, we ﬁrst argue that, in equilibrium, proposal π will be adopted
(i.e. I(π) = 1) as uj(π) > 0, ∀j ∈ [0,p].
Second, any other proposal would yield a smaller u0(π). Hence proposal π max-
imizes U0(π) = u0(π)I(π) under the restriction that g(π) = 1 and p ≥ m.
Step 5: For the agenda-setter, proposal π is preferable to proposal ˜ π, as
U0(˜ π) = ˆ s < ˆ s + Vw − (1 + λ)k = U0(π).
Hence, in case p ≥ m, proposal π will be implemented.
23Step 6: Consider the case p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w.
We claim that the optimal proposal for the agenda-setter is given by g(π) = 1,
tj(π) = (1 + λ)(m − p)sL, ∀j ∈ [0,1] and
sj(π) =

   
   
ˆ s for j = 0
0 for j ∈]0,p]
sL(π) for j ∈]p,m]




To prove the claim, note ﬁrst that proposal π will be adopted in equilibrium (i.e.
I(π) = 1) because uj(π) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [0,p] and Uj(π) = 0, j ∈]p,m].
Second, any other proposal π′ with S(π′) < S(π) would not be adopted. This
follows directly from the fact that a smaller S(π) implies that either the fraction
of subsidized project losers is smaller than m − p or the subsidy given to each
subsidized project loser is smaller than sL(π), or both. However, the fraction of
voters supporting π′ is smaller than m and thus I(π′) = 0.
Third, there is no other proposal π′ with S(π′) ≥ S(π) that yields higher utility
for the agenda-setter.
From these considerations it follows that proposal π maximizes U0(π) = u0(π)I(π)
under the restriction that g(π) = 1 and p < m, Vw ≥ V ∗
w.
Step 7: For the agenda-setter, proposal π is preferable to proposal ˜ π as
U0(˜ π) = ˆ s ≤ ˆ s + Vw − V
∗
w = U0(π).
Hence, in case p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w, proposal π will be implemented.
Step 8: Consider the case p < m <
1
1+λ and Vw < V ∗
w.
We claim that the optimal proposal for the agenda-setter is given by g(π) = 1,
tj = (1 + λ)[psW(π) + (m − p)sL(π)], ∀j ∈ [0,1] and
sj(π) =

   
   
ˆ s for j = 0
sW(π) for j ∈]0,p]
sL(π) for j ∈]p,m]




1 − (1 + λ)(m − p)






(1 + λ)k − (1 + λ)pVw − (1 − (1 + λ)p)Vl
1 − (1 + λ)m
.
To prove the claim, we ﬁrst argue that proposal π will be adopted in equilibrium
(i.e. I(π) = 1), as uj(π) = 0, ∀j ∈]0,m].
Second, any other proposal π′ with S(π′) < S(π) would not be adopted. The
reasons are the same as in Step 6.
Third, there is no other proposal π′ with S(π′) ≥ S(π) that yields higher utility
to the agenda-setter.
Again, we can conclude that proposal π as stated above maximizes U0(π) =
u0(π)I(π) under the restriction that g(π) = 1 and p < m, Vw < V ∗
w.
Step 9: For the agenda-setter, proposal ˜ π is preferable to proposal π, as
U0(˜ π) = ˆ s > ˆ s + Vw − V
∗
w > U0(π).
Hence, in the case p < m < 1
1+λ and Vw < V ∗
w, proposal ˜ π will be implemented.





< m and Vw < V ∗
w.
We claim that if 1
1+λ < m and Vw < V ∗
w, there is no constitutional proposal for
I(π) = 1.
From Step 8 we know that if Vw < V ∗
w, it will be necessary to subsidize not only a
fraction of m−p project losers but also all project winners, i.e. sW(π) > 0. This
is due to the fact that Vw is not high enough to compensate project winners for
the utility loss incurred by tax V ∗
w. In this case, the overall fraction of subsidized
voters is equal to m, so the costs for increasing all subsidies by one dollar are
equal to (1 + λ)m (i.e. in order to increase subsidies by one dollar, taxes to
the tune of (1 + λ)m have to be paid). Otherwise the beneﬁt from receiving
one dollar of redistribution is equal to one. As (1 + λ)m > 1, the costs of
redistribution are higher than the beneﬁt from redistribution, so project losers
cannot be compensated for their utility loss.15
15In order to compensate project losers for utility losses incurred by g(π) = 1, subsidies should
25B Proof of Lemma 6
We show that an ε > 0 exists such that Vw < V ∗
w holds for all |Vw − k(1 + λ)| <
|Vl − k(1 + λ)| and p < ε. We note that
V
∗
w − Vw = (1 + λ)
k − (m − p)Vl
1 − (1 + λ)(m − p)
− Vw
=
(1 + λ)k − (1 + λ)(m − p)Vl − Vw + (1 + λ)(m − p)Vw
1 − (1 + λ)(m − p)
>
(1 + λ)k + (1 + λ)(m − p)(Vw − 2k(1 + λ)) − Vw + (1 + λ)(m − p)Vw
1 − (1 + λ)(m − p)
>
(2(1 + λ)(m − p) − 1)(Vw − k(1 + λ))
1 − (1 + λ)(m − p)
,
where we have used −Vl > Vw−2k(1+λ). Recall that for all projects Vw−k(1+λ) > 0
holds. Moreover, for all p < 1
2
λ
(1+λ) we have 2(1 + λ)(m − p) − 1 > 0. Hence PALP
holds for constitution ΠT.
2
C Derivation of Welfare
The utilitarian welfare measure for a particular proposal is given by
W(π) := I(π)[(pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k)g(π) − λS(π)].
If proposals are not unique, only upper and lower bounds for welfare may be computed.
By Deﬁnition 1, a redistribution-eﬃcient proposal yields maximal welfare as dead-
weight loss from redistribution is minimized for all π for which g(π)I(π) = const.
Constitution Π
(I.) Highest levels of welfare
(i.) p ≥ m:
The lowest level of S(π) for I(π) = 1 is given by S(π) = 0. Note that,
for this case, the tax scheme must be chosen such that Vw − tj ≥ 0 holds.
become negative (note that sL(π) in Step 8 turns negative if 1 − (1 + λ)m < 0). But as we do not
allow for negative subsidies, there is no way to compensate project losers.
26Otherwise project winners would not support the proposal, and the required
majority cannot be achieved.
Hence the highest level of welfare under constitution Π in case p ≥ m is
given by
W = pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k.
(ii.) p < m:
S(π) is minimized if the smallest share of voters is subsidized with the
smallest amount of subsidies such that I(π) = 1. The smallest share of
subsidized voters occurs if a fraction of (m−p) project losers is subsidized.
The minimal subsidy that must be given to them is max{0,−Vl}. Again,
the tax scheme must be such that project winners and subsidized project
losers will support the proposal.
The highest level of welfare under constitution Π in case p < m is given by
W = pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k − λ(m − p)max{0,−Vl}.
(II.) Lowest levels of welfare
No matter if p ≥ m or p < m, the lowest level of welfare occurs if every voter
receives the maximal subsidy ˆ S, i.e. S = ˆ s. Hence the lower bound on welfare is
given by
W = pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k − λˆ s.
Constitutions ΠT, ΠS and ΠST
Under constitutions ΠT, ΠS, and ΠST, the total amount of subsidies S(π) is uniquely
given and hence welfare functions can be derived directly from Propositions 2-4.




(m − p)(V ∗
w − Vw) if p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w
0 otherwise
The project will be proposed and implemented if p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w or if p ≥ m.







pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k − λ(m − p)(V ∗
w − Vw) if p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w
0 if p < m and Vw < V ∗
w
pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k if p ≥ m
• From Proposition 3




S) = pVw − (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k − λˆ s.
• From Proposition 4
S(π) = 0 and the project will be adopted only if p ≥ m. Hence the welfare level




0 if p < m
pVw + (1 − p)Vl − (1 + λ)k if p ≥ m.
D Proof of Proposition 6
First we note that p < 1 − m implies p < m. Recall that under constitution ΠST the
project will never be implemented if p < m (see Proposition 4). Hence from an ex-ante
perspective all citizens obtain a utility of zero under constitution ΠST.
Under constitution ΠT the project may be implemented if p < m. More precisely, if
p < m, the project will be implemented if and only if Vw ≥ V ∗
w (see Proposition 2).
Rewriting this conditions shows that the project will be implemented if and only if
k ≤












pVw − (1 + λ)k − λ(m − p)
(1 + λ)k
1 − (1 + λ)(m − p)
dk, (24)
where we have used the facts that k is uniformly distributed on [0;k] and that welfare












1 − (m − p)







28Citizens weakly prefer constitution ΠT over constitution ΠST if and only if E[W(π∗
T)] ≥
0, which is equivalent to
min{k,k
∗} ≤
2p(1 − (1 + λ)(m − p)
(1 + λ)(1 − (m − p))
Vw =: ˆ k. (25)
It is straightforward to show that k∗ > ˆ k for 1 − p > m. As a consequence, utilitarian
welfare is higher for ΠT if k < ˆ k. It is higher for ΠST if k > ˆ k.
2
E Proof of Proposition 7
In order to examine the agenda-setter’s incentives for improving the project, it will be
useful to consider her utility for given project parameters and for each constitution.
From Propositions 1 to 4 we obtain
U0(π







ˆ s + Vw − V ∗
w if p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w
ˆ s if p < m and Vw < V ∗
w









0 if p < m
Vw − (1 + λ)k if p ≥ m.
(29)
Constitutions involving an arbitrary tax code (i.e. constitutions Π and ΠS) yield utility
to the agenda-setter that is independent of the project parameters Vl, k, and p. Hence
exerting costly eﬀort to enhance any project parameter other than Vw will never be
proﬁtable.
Under constitution ΠST the agenda-setter may proﬁt from exerting eﬀort if p can be
increased from p < m to p ≥ m. For suﬃciently small costs c, exerting eﬀort in order
to reduce k is optimal for p ≥ m.
Under constitution ΠT the agenda-setter proﬁts from increasing p from p < m to p ≥ m
if c is suﬃciently small. Moreover, the agenda-setter has an incentive to increase p even
in the case p < m, as long as Vw ≥ V ∗
w. If p < m and Vw < V ∗
w, the agenda-setter
29has no incentive to enhance project eﬃciency. If p ≥ m, the agenda-setter may have
incentives to reduce project costs k as under constitution πST. If p < m and Vw ≥ V ∗
w,
the agenda-setter has incentives to increase Vl and to reduce k (as V ∗
w is decreasing in
Vl and increasing in k).
Of course, the agenda-setter will enhance project eﬃciency if and only if the net gains
from exerting eﬀort exceed the costs involved in the eﬀort.
2
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